This paper discusses an interested party who wishes to influence the behavior of agents in a game, which is not under his control. The interested party cannot design a new game, cannot enforce agents' behavior, cannot enforce payments by the agents, and cannot prohibit strategies available to the agents. However, he can influence the outcome of the game by committing to non-negative monetary transfers for the different strategy profiles that may be selected by the agents. The interested party assumes that agents are rational in the commonly agreed sense that they do not use dominated strategies. Hence, a certain subset of outcomes is implemented in a given game if by adding non-negative payments, rational players will necessarily produce an outcome in this subset. Obviously, by making sufficiently big payments one can implement any desirable outcome. The question is what is the cost of implementation? In this paper we introduce the notion of k-implementation of a desired set of strategy profiles, where k stands for the amount of payment that need to be actually made in order to implement desirable outcomes. A major point in k-implementation is that monetary offers need not necessarily materialize when following desired behaviors. We define and study k-implementation in the contexts of games with complete and incomplete information.
INTRODUCTION
The design and analysis of interactions of self-interested parties are central to the theory and application of e-commerce. In particular, the theory of economic mechanism design or, more generally, implementation theory [14, 15] has become a standard tool for researchers in the area of e-commerce [23, 20, 29, 5, 31, 21] . In classical mechanism design (see e.g., [6] , Chapter 7, [13] , Chapter 23) a center defines an interaction for self-motivated parties that will allow it to obtain some desired goal (such as maximizing revenue or social welfare) taking the agents' incentives into account. This perspective has been largely motivated by the view of the center as a government or a seller that can define and control the rules of interaction. However, in many distributed systems and multi-agent interactions, interested parties can not control the rules of interactions. A network manager for example can not simply change the communication protocols in a given distributed systems in order to lead to desired behaviors, and a broker can not change the rules in which goods are sold by an agency auctioneer to the public. The focus of this paper is on how a reliable interested party, which cannot change the rules of interaction, and cannot enforce behavior, can obtain its desired goals (in service of the community or for its own benefits). The reliable party has only one source of power: its reliability. It can commit to payments to the different agents, when certain observable outcomes will be reached, and the agents can be sure that they will be paid appropriately (no formal complicated commitment schemes are necessary).
In our work we introduce the study of implementation of desired behaviors by interested party as above. 1 There are two major issues that make the task non-trivial and challenging:
1. The interested party may wish to assume as little as possible about agents' rationality. Ideally, all that will be assumed is that an agent does not adopt a strategy if it is dominated by another strategy.
2. The interested party may wish to minimize its expenses.
Consider the following simple congestion setting. 2 Assume that there are two agents, 1 and 2, that have to select 1 For another interesting use of an interested party see [17] . 2 Congestion in the context of self-motivated parties is a cen-among two service providers (e.g. machines, communication lines, etc.) One of the service providers, f , is a fast one, while the other, s, is a slower one. We capture this by having an agent obtaining a payoff of 6 when he is the only one that uses f , and a payoff of 4 when he is the only one who uses s. If both agents select the same service provider then its speed of operation decreases in a factor of 2, leading to half the payoff. That is, if both agents use f then each one of them obtains a payoff of 3, while if both agents use s then each one of them obtains 2. In a matrix form, this game is described by the following bimatrix: Assume that our reliable interested party may wish to prevent the agents from using the same service provider (leading to low payoffs for both). Then it can do as follows: it can promise to pay agent 1 a value of 10 if both agents will use f , and promise to pay agent 2 a value of 10 if both agents will use s. These promises transform M to the following game: Notice that in M , strategy f is dominant for agent 1, and strategy s is dominant for agent 2. As a result the only rational strategy profile is the one in which agent 1 chooses f and agent 2 chooses s. Hence, the interested party implements one of the desired outcomes. Moreover, given that tral topic in the recent e-commerce and distributed systems literature [11, 25, 26] , as well as in the game theory literature [24, 16] . This example is used for purposes of illustration only; however, the technique used in this example can be extended to arbitrary complex games, as we will later show.
the strategy profile (f, s) is selected the interested party will have to pay nothing. It has just implemented (in dominant strategies) a desired behavior (obtained in one of the Nash equilibria) with zero cost, relying only on its creditability, without modifying the rules of interactions or enforcing any type of behavior.
Similar simple examples can be found in other contexts (see e.g., Footnote 30, in [28] , and [30, 4] ). Our work advocates the following line of thought. Instead of reasoning about how agents will behave in the given protocol, we may wish to cause agents to follow particular behaviors by making them desirable, using monetary offers. An important point is that the monetary offers need not necessarily be fully materialized when agents follow the desired behavior.
More formally, in this paper we introduce the notion and study of k-implementation of a desired set of strategy profiles, where k stands for the amount of payment that need to be actually made in order to implement the desirable outcomes. Section 3 provides a characterization of k-implementation of a single pure strategy profile for finite games and infinite regular games with complete information. This provides an effective algorithm for determining the optimal monetary offers to be made in order to implement a desired outcome, while minimizing expenses. In Section 4 we address the problem of finding a k-implementation of a set of strategy profiles. We show that the general problem in this regard is NP-hard, and consider a modification of kimplementation, titled exact implementation, under which the problem becomes tractable. 3 Games with incomplete information introduce further challenges. In particular, in Section 5 we consider the VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions 4 . This setting has interesting characteristics since the interested party can not in general see the agents' types and need to decide on appropriate payment only based on observed behaviors. We show that in general 0-implementation (i.e. implementation with zero cost) in settings with incomplete information is impossible, but any ex-post equilibrium of a frugal VCG mechanism is 0-implementable.
In Section 6 we study the important case of mixed strategies. In that context, unless we assume algorithmic observability, the interested party can observe only the actions selected and not the probabilistic process leading to the selection, and therefore our earlier results do not apply. For example, consider the simple routing problem above, one may wish to consider the implementation of a more "fair" outcome, such as the one obtained in the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game M . In order to address this issue, we introduce the concept of implementation devices, and show that any mixed strategy equilibrium is 0-implementable with an implementation device. We also show that any correlated equilibrium has this property.
Proofs of the theorems are omitted and will appear in the full paper. 3 Complexity of implementation when the organizer controls the structure of the game is discussed in [3] . 4 The VCG mechanisms [32, 2, 7] have been widely discussed in the context of combinatorial auctions, a topic which received much attention in the recent CS and e-commerce literature, e.g., [19, 27, 22] A pre-game in strategic form is a pair G = (N, X), where N = {1, 2, · · · , n} is the set of players, X = X1×X2×· · · Xn, where for every i, Xi is the set of strategies available to player i. Let i be a player, the set of strategy profiles of all other players is denoted by X−i, and a generic element in X−i is denoted by x−i.
K-IMPLEMENTATION
A payoff function vector is an n-tuple U = (U1, U2, · · · , Un), where Ui : X → is the payoff function of player i. We assume that the payoffs of the players are represented by some common monetary unit, and that the payoff functions are bounded 5 .
A pre-game G and a payoff function vector U defines a game in strategic form denoted by G(U ). The game G(U ) is finite if the strategy sets are finite.
Let xi, yi be strategies of player i in the game G(U ). xi dominates yi if Ui(xi, x−i) ≥ Ui(yi, x−i) for every x−i ∈ X−i, and there exists x−i ∈ X−i for which a strict inequality holds. yi is a dominated strategy if it is dominated by some other strategy of i. xi is a dominant strategy for i if it dominates every other strategy of i. A profile of strategies x is a (Nash) equilibrium if for every player i, xi is a bestresponse to x−i. That is,
That is, if every player i believes that all other players act according to x, he is better off by playing according to x. Modern economic theory has made an (some times implicit) assumption that economic interactions are in equilibrium. However, it is implicitly assumed that a player who is using an equilibrium strategy believes that all other players do as well, and the rational for such a belief is in debate in many cases. In contrast, using a non-dominated strategy is a rational behavior in any reasonable definition of rationality. Moreover, refraining from the use of dominated strategies is taken as the most basic idea and agreed upon technique in decision theory.
Let G = (N, X) be a pre-game. For every vector of payoff functions V , letXi(V ) be the set of non-dominated strategies of i in the game G(V ), and letX(V ) =X1(V ) × X2(V )×, · · · ,Xn(V ).Ḡ(V ) is the game (N,X, V ), where, by an innocent abuse of notations V denotes the vector of the payoff functions restricted toX. A vector V of payoff functions is non-negative (V ≥ 0) if Vi(x) ≥ 0 for every player i and for every x ∈ X.
Consider a set of desired strategy profiles O ⊆ X in the game G(U ). A non-negative vector of payoff functions
Obviously, by paying every player i sufficient amount of money for playing the strategy associated with a particular strategy profile in O, one can implement O.
That is, the interested party commits herself to certain non-negative payoffs V , in such a way that "rational" players will lead only to strategy profiles in O, and such that in the worst case the interested party will have to pay at most k. 5 If the game is finite the payoff functions are automatically bounded.
Note that implicitly we have made two important assumptions :
• Output observability: The interested party can observe the actions chosen by the players.
• Commitment power: The interested party is reliable in the sense that the players believe that she will indeed pay the additional payoff defined by V .
However, the requirement V ≥ 0 means that the interested party cannot enforce players to make payments based on their actions. In addition, the interested party cannot modify the set of available strategies, or enforce behavior in any way. He can just reliably promise positive monetary transfers conditioned on the observed outcome.
Let k(O) be the price of implementing O. That is, k(O) is the greatest lower bound (GLB) of all non-negative numbers q for which there exists a q-implementation. That is,
K-IMPLEMENTATION OF SINGLETONS
When O is a singleton, that is O = {z}, we sometimes abuse notations and we will say that z (instead of {z}) has a k-implementation in G(U ), and we refer to k(z) as the price of implementing z.
Finite games
In this section we focus on finite games, and on the question of characterization of optimal k implementation of singletons.
Theorem 1. Let G(U ) be a finite game with at least two strategies to every player. Every strategy profile z has an optimal implementation V , and moreover:
Note that z is in equilibrium if and only if for every player i, maxx i ∈X i (Ui(xi, z−i)−Ui(zi, z−i)) = 0. Hence the following characterization of equilibrium is a corollary of Theorem 1:
Corollary 1. Let G(U ) be a finite game with at least two strategies to every player, and let z ∈ X. z is in equilibrium if and only if z has a zero-implementation.
Infinite games
When the game G(U ) is infinite, one can get phenomena that contradicts our intuition. For example, it is possible thatXi = {zi} but zi is not a dominant strategy. E.g., consider the two-person game in which player 1 can choose the strategy z1, or any number 0 < x1 < 1, and player 2 can choose z2 or x2. U1(z1, z2) = 0.5, U1(z1, x2) = 10, U1(x1, * ) = x1. U2 is an arbitrary function. It is easily seen that every x1 is dominated by a bigger number in the open interval (0,1), z1 is not dominated, and hencē X1 = {z1}. However, z1 does not dominate x1 for x1 > 0.5. Moreover, the max operator used in the proofs of Theorem 1 and 2 may not be well-defined for infinite games. A game G(U ) = (N, X, U ) is called regular if every Xi is a compact metric space, and the payoff functions are continuous on X endowed with the product metric.
Theorem 2. Theorem 1 holds for regular games.
We then immediately get:
Corollary 2. Corollary 1 holds for regular games.
Mixed strategies
For every finite set B we denote by ∆(B) the set of prob-
is the expected payoff of player i when every player j (including i) is choosing his strategy ( independently of the other players) with a randomizing device that chooses each strategy xj with probability pj(xj).
A profile of mixed strategies p ∈ X m is called a mixedstrategy equilibrium in G(U ) if p is in equilibrium in the game G m (U m ). By Nash [18] every finite game possesses a mixed strategy equilibrium. Note that every strategy xi ∈ Xi of i can be identified with the mixed strategy in which i chooses xi with probability 1. In this sense, Xi is a subset of X m i . When we deal with an environment in which mixed strategies are considered, we refer to every strategy xi ∈ Xi as a pure strategy of i.
Note that the possibility of using mixed strategies does not destroy our previous results. That is, if xi is a dominant (dominated) strategy in G(U ), it continues to be a dominant (dominated) strategy in G m (U m ).
As G m (U m ) is a regular game we can apply Theorem 2 and Corollary 2, and deduce: Theorem 3. Let G(U ) be a finite game in strategic form with at least two strategies for every player. Let p be a profile of mixed strategies in G(U ). p is a mixed strategy equilibrium in G(U ) if and only if p has a 0-implementation in G m (U m ).
Hence, technically, the case of mixed strategies follows from the theorems regarding pure strategies in infinite games. However, the reader should notice that in this case our output observability assumption has a strong implication. Implementing a mixed strategy profile in G m (U m ) actually means algorithm observability in G(U ). That is, the interested party can observe the mixed strategies used by the players. This is a realistic assumption if we think about the interested party as a system's administrator that deploys algorithms submitted by users. The designer is not allowed to alter the users' algorithms, but can verify the exact content of these algorithms. Hence, for example, in such a setting, if a user's algorithm flips a coin in order to decide on its course of action, then the exact randomized algorithms, including the particular coin flipping, can be viewed by the interested party. The interesting case in which the interested party cannot observe the mixed strategies will be discussed in Section 6.
K-IMPLEMENTATION OF SETS
In the previous sections we dealt with some properties of k-implementation. In particular we emphasized the interesting cases of k-implementations of singletons. However, from a computational perspective, given a game G(U ), and a set of desired strategy profile O, it may be of interest to find the smallest integer k ≥ 0 for which a k-implementation exists. We can show: The previous result suggests one may wish to consider relaxations of the optimal implementation problem that will be tractable. One interesting relaxation is the following one:
A non-negative vector of payoff functions V is called a k-exact implementation of O in G(U ), if the following two conditions are satisfied:
When dealing with singletons the concepts of implementation and exact implementation coincide.
Notice that the concept of exact implementation makes sense only when O = O1 × O2 · · · × On ⊆ X = X1 × X2 · · · × Xn since otherwise it will be impossible to (exactly) implement O. We also assume that Oi is strictly contained in Xi for every agent i, and that Oi does not contain two strategies that one dominates the other. We can show:
Theorem 5. Computing the optimal k for which an exact implementation exists is polynomial.
The algorithm leading to the above result is now illustrated for the case of two agents. We construct the game matrix G , where the payoff function of agent i is denoted by pi; pi describes the payment to agent i for the different strategy profiles (if/when selected). Let M = K + 1 where K is the maximal element in the original game matrix. The optimal perturbation [OP] algorithm:
1. Let (e1, . . . , e k ) the list of possible differences between an agent's payoffs in the original game (i.e. the possible results one obtains by subtracting two possible payoffs of an agent in the given game) , sorted from small to large. 13. If the non-dominated strategies for agent 2 inḠ do not coincide with O2 then let i:=i+1 and return to 10
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
In previous sections we dealt with games with complete information. However, in many real life situations the players ( and the interested party) have incomplete information about certain parameters of the game. In the economic literature this phenomenon has been mainly modelled by a Bayesian setting. In this setting every player receives some private signal, which is correlated with the unknown parameters, and the joint distribution of signals is commonly known to all players (and to the interested party). In the following subsection we deal with Bayesian games without probabilistic information. Such games are called games in informational form [9] .
Games in informational form
The precise definition of games in informational form will not be given in this paper, in which we focus on a particular type of such games -combinatorial auctions. However, a typical example is shown in 
In this games Player 1 is about to receive one of the signals s1 or t1, and Player 2 is about to receive one of the signals s2 or t2. The true game to be played is determined by the pair (c1, d2), where c, d ∈ {s, t}. However, neither player knows the exact game. Given s1 (s2) player 1 (player 2) has to choose an action in {U1, D1} ({L1, R1}), and given t1 (t2) player 1 (player 2) has to choose an action in {U2, D2} ({L2, R2}). The payoffs are shown in the figure. A Bayesian game is obtained from a game in informational form by adding a probability distribution over the pairs of signals as described in Figure 2 
A strategy of a player is a function defined on the set of signals, which assigns to every signal an action 6 in the games that are consistent with this signal. For example, in the game in Figure 1 , a strategy of player 1 is a function b1 : {s1, t1} → {U1, D1, U2, D2}, with the property that b1(s1) ∈ {U1, D1} and b1(t1) ∈ {U2, D2}. A strategy of player 2 is analogously defined as a function b2 : {s2, t2} → {L1, R1, L2, R2}. The concepts of domination and of equilibrium ( traditionally referred to as ex post equilibrium) are naturally defined. For example, in Figure 3 The strategy of player 1 in which she chooses U1 when she receives the signal s1, and she chooses D2 given t1 dominates each of the other four strategies of player 1. That is, given s1, independently of the other player's signal and action, choosing U1 is at least as good as choosing D1, and for at least one signal and action of Player 2, choosing U1 is strictly better than choosing D1. Figure 4 demonstrate an ex post equilibrium. Note that even under the output observability assumption a player does not have to reveal her strategy. The signal of a player is her private knowledge, and she reveals only the action she chooses. The interested party does not observe the signals; therefore, if the action sets in all games are the same ( as is the case in Figure 4 ) the interested party does not receive any information about the true game to be played. Hence, the only thing he can do is to use the same vector V at all games. We can show: Claim It is impossible to 0-implement the ex post equilibrium described in Figure 4 .
As is stated in the next subsection, when the game in informational form has a particular structure, our results for the complete information case are generalized.
The VCG combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions constitute a special class of games in informational form. Our notations and definitions are taken from [10] .
In a VCG combinatorial auction there is a seller, denoted by 0, who wishes to sell a set of m goods A = {a1, . . . , am}, m ≥ 1, that she owns. We denote by 2 A the family of all bundles of goods (i.e., subsets of A). There is a set of n buyers N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 1. An allocation of the goods is an ordered partition γ = (γ0, γ1, . . . , γn) of A. 7 We denote by Γ the set of all allocations.
A buyer's valuation function is a function v : 2 A → , satisfying v(∅) = 0 and
When buyer i with the valuation function vi receives the set of goods B, and pays a monetary transfer ci ∈ his utility is vi(B) − ci. Every buyer knows his valuation function.
We denote by V the set of all possible valuation functions. The set V N , the n-fold product of the set V , is the set of all profiles of valuations v = (v1, . . . , vn), one for each buyer.
For an allocation γ = (γ0, γ1, . . . , γn) ∈ Γ and a profile of valuations v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V N we denote by S(v, γ) the total social surplus of the buyers, that is,
We also denote
and we refer to an allocation γ that achieves this maximum as an optimal allocation for v.
A Vickrey-Clarke (VC) auction mechanism is described as follows. Every buyer i is required to report a valuation function vi. Based on the reported valuations v = ( v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V N the mechanism selects an allocation
, which is optimal for v. Because ties are possible, such an allocation may not be unique, and therefore there is more than one VC mechanism. Every function d : V N → Γ satisfying S( v, d( v)) = Smax( v) for all v ∈ V N determines uniquely a VC mechanism, which we refer to as the VC mechanism d. This mechanism assigns to buyer i the bundle di( v) and makes him pay c d i ( v) to the seller, where
This represents the loss to the other agents' total surplus caused by agent i's presence. A Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction mechanism is parameterized by a VC mechanism d, and by an n-tuple h = (h1, . . . , hn) of functions hi : V N \{i} → . The mechanism selects an allocation according to the allocation function d, and the transfer function of buyer i is
Hence, a VC auction mechanism is a special type of VCG auction mechanism, in which hi is the function that is identically equal to zero for every i. Let AM = (d, h) be a VCG mechanism. The utility of i with the valuation vi depends on the vector of reported valuations v = (vi, v−i), and it is denoted by ui(vi, vi, v−i). That is,
. The behavior of buyer i in a mechanism AM is described by a strategy bi : V → V .
A strategy bi is a dominant strategy for i if the following two conditions hold: 8
• For every vi ∈ V , and for every v−i ∈ V N \{i}
A strategy profile (b1, . . . , bn) forms an ex post equilibrium if for every profile of valuations v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V N , and for every buyer i,
It is well-known that every VCG auction mechanism is truth-telling in the sense that for every buyer i, the strategy bi(vi) = vi of revealing the true valuation is a dominant strategy. 9 A special type of strategies was considered in [9, 10] . A bundling strategy for buyer i is parameterized by a subfamily Σi of 2 A such that ∅ ∈ Σi, and is denoted by
This has the effect of pretending that the agent cares only about bundles in Σi (for which he announces his true valuation), and derives his valuation for other bundles by maximizing over the bundles in Σi that they contain.
A valuation v Σ i that satisfies the above equalities is said to be based on Σi ( or, simply Σi-based). The set of all Σ-based valuation function is denoted by V Σ .
A subfamily Σ of 2 A such that ∅ ∈ Σ is a quasi field if it satisfies the following two conditions: 8 In Classical mechanism design the second condition is not required. We use it here for the sake of consistency with the rest of this paper. 9 This is one of the reasons to the fact that the concept of ex post equilibrium in the VCG auction mechanisms with private values has largely been ignored in the economics literature. However, the truth telling strategy is induces a high communication complexity; It requires each player to communicate 2 m numbers. Hence, from the computer science perspective, an ex post equilibrium with less communication complexity is desirable. The tradeoff between communication complexity and economic efficiency is discussed in [9] .
In [10] it was proved that every ex post equilibrium in the VCG mechanisms is a bundling equilibrium in the following sense: For every n ≥ 3, every profile (b1, b2, · · · , bn) of strategies, which satisfies that any subprofile (bi) i∈N , N ⊆ N , is an ex post equilibrium in all VCG mechanisms is a symmetric profile of bundling strategies. That is, there exists ∅ ∈ Σ ⊆ 2 A such that bi = f Σ for every i ∈ N , and moreover, it was proved in [9] that this Σ must be a quasi field.
0-Implementation of ex post equilibrium in frugal VCG auction mechanisms
We begin with a formal definition of a frugal VCG combinatorial auction: Definition of Frugal VCG mechanisms A VCG mechanism (d, h) is called frugal if d does not allocate unnecessary goods to the buyers. That is, for every v = ( v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V N the mechanism selects an allocation
, which is optimal for v and satisfies in addition:
• For every player i, and for every Bi ⊂ γi, vi(Bi) < vi(γi),
Consider an interested party who wishes to 0-implement the ex post equilibrium b = (b1, b2, · · · , bn) in the VCG auction mechanism (d, h). Given the result of [10] stated at the end of the previous subsection we can assume almost without loss of generality that bi = f Σ for every i ∈ N . The interested party wishes to promise a positive payment to every buyer i whenever he follows the recommendation to play according to bi, and at least one of the players, say j, do not play according to bj. However, the interested party does not know the valuation functions. Hence, how could she know whether a player follows the recommendation? Indeed she cannot. However, since Σ is known to the interested party she can partially monitor the players strategies, because, independently of a player's valuation function his reported valuation function must be Σ-based. Hence, the best the interested party can do is to offer every player i a positive payment if his reported valuation is Σ-based, and at least one of the other players' reported a valuation function, which is not Σ-based. These payments can be made arbitrary high so that reporting a Σ-based valuation function will yield a higher payoff for i than any other, non Σ-based valuation function if at least one of the other players does not report a Σ-based valuation function. However, player i can cheat within the set of Σ-based valuations without being caught! It turns out that when the VCG mechanism is frugal, every player is better off not cheating. Lemma 1. Let (d, h) be a frugal VCG mechanism, let Σ be a quasi field, and let i ∈ N . For every profiles of reported valuations of the other players, v−i
In the proof of Lemma 1 we use the fact that a frugal VCG mechanism must allocate a subset of goods in Σ to every player who reports a Σ-based valuation function. In the full paper we show that Lemma 1 does not hold for an arbitrary VCG mechanism.
We need the following terminology. Let (d, h) be a VCG combinatorial auction, and letM > 0. We denote by (d, h,M ) the combinatorial auction with the rules induced by (d, h) in which, the set of feasible valuation functions is V (M ), which is the set of all valuation functions v satisfying v(A) <M .
The assumption of an upper bound is natural but note common in the literature of mechanism design. It can be verified that all our previously quoted and proved results hold for the VCG combinatorial auctions with bounded valuation functions. Theorem 6. Let (d, h,M ) be a frugal VCG auction mechanism with at least two buyers. Let Σ be a quasi fields of bundles. Then the symmetric ex post equilibrium induced by Σ is 0-implementable.
By [10] , the following is a corollary of Theorem 6:
Corollary 3. For n ≥ 3, every ex post equilibrium in the VCG combinatorial auctions is 0-implementable in any frugal VCG mechanism with bounded valuation functions.
IMPLEMENTATION DEVICES
As we mentioned in Section 3, the proof of our result (Theorem 3) that every mixed strategy equilibrium is 0implementable relies on the assumption that the interested party observes the mixed strategies used by the players. In this section we prove this result without this assumption. That is, the interested party can observe only the actions generated by the mixed strategies, but not the algorithms that generate them. In order to deal with this issue we define a new type of implementation by an implementation device.
Let G(U ) = (N, X, U ) be a finite game in strategic form. An implementation device for G(U ) is a tuple I = (S, h,Ṽ ), where S = S1 × S2 · · · × Sn, h ∈ ∆(S) is a probability distribution over S, andṼ : S × X → +. Si is the finite 10 set of signals that can be sent to i. The interested party uses the implementation device I as follows: She makes the device public, and secretly runs a randomizing scheme that chooses every s ∈ S with a probability h(s). If s = (s1, s2, · · · , sn) is chosen, she sends player i the signal si. The implementation device generates a new game G(U, I). This is actually a Bayesian game. A strategy for i in this game is a function bi : Si → Xi. For every si and xi, and a vector b−i of the other players let Wi(xi|si, b−i) be the expected payoff of i in the game G(U, I) if if it chooses xi given that it receives the signal si and all other players use b−i. That is,
where s−i = (sj) j =i , and b−i(s−i) = (bj(sj)) j =i . A strategy bi is a dominant strategy for i if for every signal si with a positive probability (that is t∈S,t i =s i h(t) > 0), and for every b−i Wi(bi(si)|si, b−i) ≥ Wi(xi|si, b−i) for every xi ∈ Xi, and there exists a profile b−i of the other players for which a strict inequality holds. 10 If S is an infinite set, we must specify additional parameters required in probability theory. We associate with each Si a σ-algebra of events Σi, we endow S with the product σalgebra, Σ, and we define h over Σ.
Every profile b = (bi)i∈N determines a probability distribution prob b over X defined as follows: prob b (x) = h(b1 = x1, b2 = x2, · · · , bn = xn).
Let ξ be a desired probability distribution over X. We say that I implements ξ in G(U ), if in G(U, I) every player i has a dominant strategy bi, and prob b = ξ. We say that I is a k-implementation of ξ in G(U ) if I implements ξ, and for every s with h(s) > 0, n i=1Ṽ i(si, bi(si)) ≤ k.
Mixed Strategies: Removing the algorithm observability assumption
Let p = (p1, p2, · · · , pn) be a mixed strategy profile in a finite game G(U ). p generates a probability distribution ξp over S as follows:
ξp(x) = p1(x1)p2(x2) · · · pn(xn) for every x ∈ X.
We say that an implementation device I implements p if it implements ξp.
In order to implement a mixed strategy equilibrium , the interested party employs an implementation device I, in which the set of signals Si is the set of actions of i, Xi. h is the product probability of p. That is, h(x) = p1(x1)p2(x2) · · · pn(xn), and the functionṼi : Si × Xi → + is designated in such a way that the strategy bi(si) = si, si ∈ Xi, is a dominant strategy for every player i.
Hence, the interested party flips a coin for each player i according to the probability pi in the profile she wishes to implement, and she sends the outcome of this coin flipping to i. Thus, the signals sent to the players are just recommendations to play. The payoff functionsṼi, i ∈ N are designed in such a way that obeying the recommendation is a dominant strategy for every player.
Theorem 7. Let G(U ) be a finite game with at least two actions for every player. Every mixed strategy equilibrium profile p is 0-implementable in G(U ) with an appropriate implementation device I = (S, h,Ṽ ) in which S = X, and h = ξp is the product probability on X defined by p.
0-implementations of correlated equilibrium
Aummann 1974 [1] introduced the concept of correlated equilibrium. We provide one of the many equivalent definitions: Definition Let G(U ) = (N, X, U ) be a finite game in strategic form. A correlated equilibrium of G(U ) is a probability distribution ξ over X (ξ ∈ ∆(X)) such that the strategies bi(si) = si, si ∈ Xi, i ∈ N , form an equilibrium in the game G(U, I), where I = (S, h,Ṽ ) is the following implementation device:
• S = X,
• h = ξ,
•Ṽi(s, x) = Ui(x) for every i ∈ N and for every s, x ∈ X.
Hence, ξ forms a correlated equilibrium if a mediator who makes no changes in the players' payoff can run a randomization device according to ξ, picks a profile of pure actions s, and sends every player i the recommendation to play si, and every player is better off obeying the recommendation if she believes that all other players obey the recommendations. It is well-known (and it was implicitly used in the proof of Theorem 7) that if p is a mixed strategy equilibrium, ξp is a correlated equilibrium. Moreover, going over the proof of Theorem 7 reveals that the only property of the mixed-strategy equilibrium p that we use is the fact that ξp is a correlated equilibrium. Hence we get: Theorem 8. Let G(U ) = (N, X, U ) be a finite game with at least two actions for every player. Every correlated equilibrium profile ξ is 0-implementable in G(U ) with an appropriate implementation device I = (S, h,Ṽ ) in which, S = X and h = ξ.
Note that eventually, when the interested party implements a mixed strategy equilibrium or a correlated equilibrium with the implementation device I, the players are using pure strategies in the game G(U, I). Because the expected value operator is linear, it can be easily seen that obeying the recommendation remains a dominant strategy for every player even if this player believes that the other players use mixed strategies in G(U, I), where a mixed strategy of i in G(U, I) is a probability distribution Qi over the set of his pure strategies. A mixed strategy is not a natural description of behavior in G(U, I). A more natural, and less computational demanding concept is the one of behavior strategy: A behavior strategy of i in the game G(U, I) is a function ci : Si → ∆(Xi). Hence, a player who is using a behavioral strategy chooses a mixed strategy in a game in strategic form as a function of his signal, while a player who is using a mixed strategy in G(U, I) is picking a pure strategy in G(U, I) with a randomization device before he receives the signal. The sets of mixed and behavioral strategies are not technically related to each other. However, by [12] ( see also [8] for details), for every player i, for every strategy bi of i and for every profile Q−i = (Qj) j =i of mixed strategies of the other players, there exists a profile c−i = (cj) j =i of behavioral strategies of the other players such that for every signal si the expected utility of i when using bi given that all other players are using Q−i equals his expected utility when all other players are using c−i, and vice versa. 11 Hence, theorems 7 and 8 remain valid in an environment that allows the utilization of either mixed or behavioral strategies in G(U, I).
